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Abstract
We examine the hypothesis that the Norwegian innovation system is locked-in to a specializa-
tion pattern of scale dependent, resource intensive industries, in which innovation depends 
mainly on the in-house activities of (a few) large firms. To this extent, we employ a sectoral 
empirical analysis using data on industrial dynamics and innovation in the Norwegian econ-
omy. Our results indicate that although the Norwegian economy has parts that are resource- 
and scale dependent, and also sectors in which the market structure is inert and concentrated, 
these characteristics are not systematically related to the level and nature of innovation activi-
ties. Our results indicate that innovation in Norway takes place in two main regimes: a high-
intensive and a low-intensive regime. This is not correlated systematically with industrial dy-
namics. 
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Introduction 
Narula (2002) has argued that in “(…) Norway, two groups of firms exist. Group A firms 
benefit from a systemic lock-in. These are large firms in traditional sectors, which are highly 
embedded, and around whom the Norwegian SI [system of innovation] has been built. (…) 
Group B firms are in science based sectors for whom lock-in results in inefficiencies” (p.795). 
This suggests that the three innovation system layers or paths identified in a historical analysis 
of the Norwegian SI (Wicken, 2007) have a lasting influence in today’s innovation system in 
Norway. According to Wicken (2007) the Norwegian National Innovation System (NIS) is a 
historical outcome of three major industrial transformation processes: A small scale decentral-
ized path, a large scale path, and a science based network path. These paths have given rise to 
3 distinct innovation system layers which currently characterize the Norwegian economy: 
Group A firms are clearly recognizable as belonging to a large scale industrialization path, 
while those in Group B are representative of a R&D intensive network based industrialization 
path. Narula’s hypothesis of systemic lock-in argues that the historical co-evolution of the 
institutional context in which innovation takes place, and industrial dynamics within each of 
the paths, has led to a situation in which the Group B firms are at a disadvantage because of a 
mismatch between their modus operandus and the way in which the broad innovation system 
in Norway works. 
The argument about lock-in of the Norwegian innovation system says that subsets of sectors 
in the Norwegian economy share a broad institutional context, shaped by the particular Nor-
wegian specialization pattern and historical development of policies, and that these character-
istics are important drivers of the innovation performance of the sectors. The historically 
dominant role of resource based firms, according to this argument, has led to a set of institu-
tions that is particularly suited to support firms in these sectors. A mechanism of mutual rein-2
forcement is at work: the institutions make the firms successful, and this in turn leads to a 
larger demand for policies, developing the institutional structure further in the direction of the 
resource based and large scale industries. As a result, the wider innovation system in Norway 
becomes inert and little inclined to change to a new development path. The system becomes 
relatively closed off to new science based entrants associated with the third development path. 
Narula’s analysis is carried out in the context of the internationalization of R&D by large 
companies, but it obviously has implications for the broader context of innovation, including 
the activities of smaller firms and those that operate exclusively domestically. Our aim in this 
paper is to investigate the possibility of systemic lock-in of the Norwegian innovation system 
in such a broader context, using recent quantitative evidence on innovation and industrial dy-
namics in Norway. We argue that the way to extend Narula’s argument to this broader context 
is to use the notion of innovation regimes, which has been proposed in the recent literature 
covering the empirically observed diversity between sectors in terms of innovation and indus-
trial dynamics. Obviously, the conceptualizations that Narula uses do not readily extend to the 
broader issues of industrial dynamics and innovation, and we will therefore have to formulate 
an adaptation of the lock-in hypothesis below. 
In more general terms, this paper seeks to provide a broader empirical basis for a categoriza-
tion of economic activity and innovation at the industrial sector level in Norway. We will use 
the term taxonomy to describe this process, and our aim is to advance the understanding of 
how differences and similarities between industrial sectors in Norway are related to the nature 
of innovation and knowledge underlying industrial innovation on the one hand, and the dy-
namics of market structure on the other hand, by using the notion of “technological regimes”. 
The concept of a technological regime has been proposed by Nelson and Winter (1982) as a 3
framework for interpreting the observed differences in innovative behavior and industrial dy-
namics across industrial sectors, and has been broadly used to describe the knowledge envi-
ronment in which firms search for refinements to their production routines (Winter, 1984).  
We focus on the properties of innovative processes and the link with the patterns and dynam-
ics of industrial structure and competition. At the empirical level, we measure the relevant 
dimensions and characteristics of the technology and knowledge domain underlying innova-
tion in industrial sectors, as well as the dynamics of industrial structure. We use a combina-
tion of factor and cluster analysis to carry out the taxonomy. The analysis results in a classifi-
cation of sectors into two technology regimes, and four industrial dynamics regimes. Combin-
ing the technology and industrial dynamics classifications yields eight regimes capturing the 
main technological and market environments in which firms operate in Norway.  
The paper extends previous work in this line of inquiry in at least three ways: (1) The analysis 
is extended to cover the service sector, which is increasingly important to the economies of 
industrialized countries, such as Norway, (2) in the innovation domain, the analysis is based 
on a detailed database on innovation activities, not just R&D data, and (3) detailed data on 
industrial dynamics is used and subsequently related to the technology dynamics underlying 
industrial sectors. The analysis suggests that a part of the industrial landscape in Norway can 
be described as insider dominated and relatively closed off to new entrants, in line with Na-
rula’s (2002) Group A. However, our results also suggest that these sectors are relatively 
highly innovative, i.e., the closed nature of this part of the economy does not seem to lead to 
low innovative activity. Also, we find that some of the sectors that are perhaps most likely to 
belong to the closed and inert part of the Norwegian economy are more open to entry and in-
novation than often thought. A particularly interesting finding in our analysis is that although 4
the dichotomy between sectors that we find in the innovation domain can in many respects be 
seen as a high- and low-innovation intensity dichotomy, this seems largely unrelated to indus-
trial dynamics. In other words, the innovation regimes cut across industrial regimes (or vice 
versa) rather than a strong correlation existing between the two. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we will discuss theory and empirical evidence 
regarding the interpretation of the relationship between innovation and the dynamics of mar-
ket structure and competition. This section will conclude with a discussion of how we extend 
Narula’s argument about systemic lock-in, and formulate the hypotheses that we will test in 
the empirical part. Section 3 describes the data used in the measurement of the relevant as-
pects of technology and industrial dynamics, as well as the methodology used to classify in-
dustrial sectors into a set of technological regimes. In section 4 we apply a combination of 
factor and cluster analysis to the data and report, as well as discuss the results. The last sec-
tion, 5, summarizes the main conclusions.  
Innovation and the dynamics of market structure and competition 
A main theoretical aim in this paper is to reconcile research on industrial innovation with that 
on market structure and industrial dynamics in order to understand the sectoral specialization 
pattern of the Norwegian economy. While the relation between market structure and innova-
tion (or more properly, R&D intensity) was the topic of much early literature, we start from a 
line of research developed only recently. The reason is that in the early literature, which fo-
cused mostly on relating measures of market concentration with R&D intensity, sectors where 
largely considered as relatively homogenous entities that could usefully be represented by 
simple and uni-dimensional measures of concentration and innovation.
2 But reviews of this 
empirical literature have concluded that firm size and industry concentration are not clear-cut 5
determinants of industrial innovation, as empirical results have been mixed, and that the im-
pact of firm size upon R&D seems to be conditioned by the industry context (Cohen and 
Levin, 1989; Levin et al 1985). Hence there seems to be a need for a more elaborate measur-
ing tool. 
Therefore, our theoretical approach starts from the notion that the empirical relationship be-
tween firm size and industry concentration on technological change is conditioned by inter-
industry differences in technological opportunities and appropriability conditions (Winter, 
1984), suggesting that the nature of technology sets boundaries to the pattern of industrial 
competition. This is line with, e.g., Nelson and Winter’s (1982) evolutionary approach, which 
argues that innovation and market structure are jointly determined by technological condi-
tions. They use the term technological regime to describe this, and define such a regime as the 
technological or knowledge environment encompassing and setting boundaries to firms learn-
ing activities (Winter, 1984; Marsili and Verspagen, 2002). A particularly relevant dimension 
of the technological condition is the ability of new firms to enter the market via novel innova-
tions, as opposed to technological environments where incumbents can cumulatively build 
upon past innovative success. Nelson and Winter (1982) and Winter (1984) have accordingly 
identified two technological regimes: an “entrepreneurial” regime associated with science 
based technology and easy entry of innovative new firms due to a universal and non-
cumulative knowledge base, and a “routinized” regime that favours innovation by incumbents 
due to the cumulative nature of technology and the knowledge base. In simulation models, 
these two technological regimes generated distinct properties of the structure and performance 
of industries, where innovation rates, average firm age, profitability and market concentration 
were higher in the “routinized” regime as opposed to the “entrepreneurial” regime (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982; Winter, 1984). 6
This work has been extended by more empirically oriented scholars (e.g., Breschi et al, 2000; 
Malerba and Orsinigo, 1996; Marsili and Verspagen 2002; Van Dijk, 2000) whose aim has 
been to empirically identify the existence of technological regimes, and to relate differences 
in market structure and industrial dynamics across industries to the technological environment 
encompassing and setting boundaries to firms’ innovative activities. One empirical approach 
has been to rely closely on the specific dimensions of technological opportunity, appropriabil-
ity conditions, cumulativeness of learning, and the nature of the knowledge base (Dosi, 1988; 
Dosi et al, 1995; Malerba and Orsenigo 1996; Van Dijk, 2000), which were the main vari-
ables of interest in the theoretical work in Nelson and Winter (1982) and Winter (1984). In 
most cases this empirical work has led to the identification of a Schumpeter Mark 1 and 
Schumpeter Mark 2 taxonomy of regimes with technological characteristics similar to the 
“entrepreneurial” and “routinized” distinction advocated by Nelson and Winter (1982). 
A related approach has been to explore sectoral patterns of innovation from the point of view 
of knowledge sources. This was pioneered by Pavitt (1984), in his work based on the SPRU 
Innovation database. Pavitt identified the following three dominant patterns of industrial in-
novation and sectoral technical change in the UK manufacturing sector; (1) supplier domi-
nated, (2) production intensive, and (3) science based. His second category (production inten-
sive) is further subdivided into scale intensive and specialized suppliers sectors. Marsili 
(2001) modified the Pavitt taxonomy, arriving at five clusters of sectors. Marsili and Ver-
spagen (2002) applied the Marsili taxonomy to the Dutch manufacturing sector, using 
datasources similar to ours. Castellacci (2007) has further extended the line of inquiry pio-
neered by Pavitt and developed a new taxonomy of technological regimes which is confirmed 7
by using a database of European industries, although this work does not include aspects of 
market structure and dynamics in the analysis.  
With the exception of Miozzo and Soete (2001) few attempts have been made to include ser-
vice sectors in the analysis. Based upon a refinement of Pavitt’s taxonomy, Miozzo & Soete 
(2001) identified the three following regimes in the service sector: (1) supplier dominated, (2) 
Scale intensive physical networks sectors and information network sectors, and (3) Science 
based and specialized suppliers sectors. A central aspect of Miozzo and Soete’s (2001) argu-
ment is the emphasis on the close linkage between manufacturing and service in the origin 
and application of technological change (e.g., user-producer interactions). It is thus interesting 
to note that prior research in this tradition, although arguing for the technological closeness of 
manufacturing and service industries has not included these industries in the same analysis. 
Hence, we know little about the extent to which technological regimes cut across the manu-
facturing and services distinction, and this is an issue that we intend to tackle here. 
The literature on technological regimes that we have discussed so far is largely quantitatively 
oriented, and therefore relies on the type of information that can be captured in the Innovation 
surveys (CIS) and/or industrial dynamics statistics. The recently developed Sectoral Innova-
tion Systems approach (SIS, see Malerba, 2005) extends this to include more qualitative data 
based on interviews and sector specific studies of interaction between various types of actors. 
Like the more quantitative literature, the main point in the SIS approach is that the knowledge 
base, the pattern of interactions among the actors, and the institutions governing these interac-
tions, are believed to differ across sectors and to constitute distinct innovation systems (see 
Malerba, 2005 for a review). Because of its focus on the more qualitative and historically 
rooted characteristics of sectors, the SIS approach is particularly relevant for the questions 8
that we wish to investigate (the historical lock-in pattern of the Norwegian specialization). We 
refer the reader to sector specific studies on the aluminum industry, the aquaculture industry, 
the petroleum industry, the ICT sector and biotech sector by Moen (2007), Wiig Aslesen 
(2007), Engen (2007), Grønning (2007) and Sogner (2007) for an SIS-related approach to this 
issue from a Norwegian perspective.  
While prior research has provided useful insights into the importance and significance of 
technological regimes and sectoral innovation systems, especially three issues remain unex-
plored. First of all, past empirical research in this tradition has not included service sectors in 
the analysis. Service industries are of increasing importance as sources of employment growth 
and innovation (Miles, 2005). By excluding these sectors, a rather narrow picture on the rela-
tionship between the nature of technology and the dynamics of market structure and industrial 
competition has been offered. The failure to include service industries in large scale innova-
tion databases has arguably been the reason why no attempt has been made to explore whether 
technological regimes or sectoral innovation systems cut across manufacturing and service 
industries. A main ambition in this paper is thus to explore the extent to which firms in the 
manufacturing and service industries face similar technological environments or innovation 
systems. 
Secondly, few details on the dynamics of market structure have been included in the analysis. 
Past research has mostly focused on entry, exit and survival dynamics, and largely neglected 
other sources of industrial dynamics such as for instance spin-outs and mergers, although this 
is a recommended avenue for further research (Winter, 1984). We will remedy this and in-
clude a richer set of industrial dynamics indicators. Thirdly, interactions between sectoral 
innovation systems and the national innovation system embedding innovative activity and 9
industrial dynamics in sectors have not been well-researched. In our Norwegian case, as we 
discussed in the introduction, prior research has suggested that the Norwegian economy is 
“locked in” to a particular type of activities, mostly related to the large scale based pattern of 
industrialization (Narula, 2002). However, no large scale quantitative study has been under-
taken to verify the existence of such patterns of sectoral specialization in Norway.
While the first two of these issues are addressed by the use of a new database, the third one 
requires us to link the idea of systemic lock-in (Narula, 2002) to the literature on technology 
regimes and sectoral taxonomies of innovation systems. At a broad and general level, the idea 
of systemic lock-in of an innovation system says that a particular institutional environment 
has emerged in which innovation thrives. If the lock-in is particularly strong, it may cause a 
lack of institutional diversity, because the inefficient regimes have been driven from the sys-
tem. However, in a less drastic lock-in, we would expect that multiple institutional environ-
ments exist, but that these show different levels of efficiency with regard to innovation. Such 
a situation of some institutional variety, rather than a complete lock-in, seems to be the case 
for the Norwegian innovation system, as argued by Narula (2002). 
The literature on technological regimes that we have briefly discussed above puts great em-
phasis on conditions of appropriability of knowledge as a determinant of the knowledge base. 
This is the main factor that determines the distinction between routinized and entrepreneurial 
innovation regimes. But obviously, the conditions underlying a technological regime are 
broader than just appropriability. Narula (2002, p. 802) lists three main categories of factors 
that have historically led to the lock-in: energy policy in Norway (that has favoured energy-
intensive, large scale industry), protection of Norwegian industry from foreign direct invest-
ment, and industrial policy (including technology policy) targeting specific sectors. Our ex-10
tension of Narula’s lock-in hypothesis argues that these factors will have had an impact in two 
main dimensions: industrial market dynamics, and innovation. If the lock-in that Narula sig-
nals for the case of foreign activities of Norwegian firms has a broader implication for the 
Norwegian innovation system, we expect that our data analysis will reveal distinct patterns 
related to these two dimensions, i.e., that there will be a dichotomy between sectors both in 
the realm of industrial dynamics, and in the innovation realm. Moreover, in the case of a lock-
in, we expect that these dimensions are related, i.e., that the likelihood that a sector falls in 
any of the categories in the industrial dynamics dimension, is related to its innovation per-
formance (and vice versa).  
Obviously, the nature of the lock-in that Narula proposes has implications for the nature of the 
regimes that we expect to find. With respect to the industrial dynamics regimes, we expect 
that the emphasis on scale economies and resource-intensity will have led to concentrated 
market structures, large firm size, and a low level of market turbulence in the dominating part 
of the Norwegian economy. On the other hand, we expect that a smaller part of the economy 
will be characterized by a more competitive and open market structure, particularly in eco-
nomic sectors related to the ‘third path’ of science based industrialization. In addition, we 
expect that these two industrial dynamics regimes will be characterized by different technol-
ogy and innovation dynamics. We expect that innovation in the closed and concentrated mar-
ket regime will be based on process innovation, in-house R&D, and a low degree of coopera-
tion with other firms (possibly higher levels of cooperation with universities and/or the insti-
tutes sector). In the more competitive market regime, innovation is expected to take a more 
open character (e.g., less dependence in in-house resources, less dependence on protection of 
intellectual property rights, and stronger patterns of cooperation), and we expect that more 
emphasis is put on product innovation.  11
If, on the other hand, the idea of lock-in does not extend to the broader context of the Norwe-
gian innovation system, we expect that differences between sectors are still important, and 
hence that industrial dynamics regimes and innovation regimes are visible in the data. How-
ever, without a lock-in, we expect that the variety of possible outcomes is larger, and hence 
the correlation between industrial dynamics regimes and innovation regimes is much less 
strict.
Data and method 
Our database is a combination of two different sources. Information about R&D, innovation, 
the sources of innovation, and the like is derived from a combined R&D and innovation sur-
vey, where the innovation part constitutes the third Community Innovation Survey (CIS) for 
Norway. The combined survey contains large amounts of information about firms’ innovation 
activities (CIS survey) and questions about how R&D activities are financed (R&D survey), 
and is answered by the firm manager. Apart from the fact that a few industrial sectors were 
excluded from the sampling frame, most notably Hotels and Restaurants, Retail Trade and 
some Financial Service industries like Real Estate, the combined survey was directed to a 
representative sample of the Norwegian enterprise population with 10 employees or more and 
is representative of an enterprise population of about 12000 firms.  There was a random selec-
tion of units with 10 to 49 employees. All units with 50 employees or more were included in 
the sampling frame. The survey was further stratified according to industrial sectors using two 
digit NACE and size classes. In total, the questionnaire was returned by 3899 firms which 
constitute a response rate of 93 %, minimizing problems like sample selection. From this da-
tabase the following indicators are constructed, measuring technology and innovation (see 
Table 1 for a summary of details): Innovation resources (formal R&D, total innovation ex-12
penditures), number of innovating firms; product and process innovators as a fraction of the 
population, ratio of product to process innovators, number of innovators with permanent 
R&D), innovation expenditures (spread over categories), hampering factors (spread over 
categories), and protection of innovation (different methods used).  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The other data source is the business register of the entire enterprise and business unit popula-
tion in Norway. This database contains information about 458,000 establishments belonging 
to some 415,000 enterprises, including self-employed entrepreneurs with zero employees. 
Information at the business unit level, such as employment and turnover, was aggregated to 
the enterprise level in order to provide as close a match as possible to the enterprises included 
in the combined R&D and innovation survey. A highly novel feature with this database is that 
it does not only contain information needed on entry and exit statistics at the industry level, 
but also records changes or vital events taking place among business units of multi-
establishment enterprises. Thus, we are able to provide a rather detailed picture about the in-
dustrial dynamics taking place at the sectoral level and how this relates to underlying differ-
ences in the technology domain. From the industrial dynamics datasource the following indi-
cators are constructed, measuring market concentration and industrial dynamics (see Table 2 
for a summary): Concentration (size classes, C4, C20), market turbulence (different types of 
entry and exit), and the details of industrial dynamics taking place (various types of vital 
events).13
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The primary measure of entry and exit is defined in the usual way: the number of new entrants 
or exits (both defined as firms, i.e., at the enterprise level) as a percentage of all firms in the 
industry in 2001.
3 However, using the establishment level data in our database, we are able to 
go beyond this traditional measure of market turbulence. First, we identify a specific subset of 
entrants and exits as those enterprises that have no employees (i.e., self-employed entrepre-
neurs). We label this as “entrepreneurial” entry or exit, and express it again as a percentage of 
all firms in the industry (by definition, the entrepreneurial entry/exit rate is smaller, or in the 
limit equal to, the overall entry/exit rate). The non-entrepreneurial entry/exit rate is then de-
fined as the overall entry/exit rate minus the entrepreneurial entry/exit rate. Firm survival is 
measured as the percentage of firms in the industry that were also in the industry 5 years ago. 
Next, we are able to observe five distinct events that are related to the mobility of establish-
ments and their relation to enterprises. We label these events as take-over, divesting, expan-
sion, spin-out, and transformation. A take-over occurs when an existing establishment moves 
into a different enterprise than the one it belonged to, and the latter enterprise is closed down. 
Hence, a take-over is also an exit (of the enterprise that originally owned the establishment), 
and we do include it in the measurement of the exit rate. Divesting occurs when an establish-
ment moves from one enterprise to another, and the original owner remains active in the sec-
tor. Thus, divesting is similar to a take-over, the only difference lies in the question of 
whether the original owner of the establishment remains in business. Expansion is defined as 
the birth of a new establishment, owned by an existing enterprise. A spin-out occurs when an 
existing establishment becomes an independent enterprise, and the old owner of the estab-
lishment survives as an enterprise. Hence, a spin-out is a form of entry, and we include it in 14
the measurement of the entry rate. Finally, a transformation is similar to a spin-out, with the 
exception that the enterprise that owned the establishment goes out of the market (hence a 
transformation is both an entry and an exit, and we measure it as such). Table 3 summarizes 
the definitions of our detailed variables on industry dynamics. In the analysis, we always ex-
press the number of occurrences of take-over, divesting, expansion, spin-out or transformation 
as a percentage of the total population. Occurrence of any of these events is measured as the 
number of enterprises involved in an activity (e.g., when an enterprise takes over two distinct 
establishments, it is counted as a single take-over). 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 4 provides summary statistics of the variables that we employ to measure industrial 
dynamics. The means of the entry and exit rates are rather close to each other, and the same 
holds for the entrepreneurial versions of these rates. Slightly less than half (unweighted aver-
age over sectors) of all entry and exit is entrepreneurial. For the detailed market dynamics 
events, we observe that the one that is most frequent is the combination of take-over, divest-
ing and expansion, i.e., when an enterprise combines all these three forms in the single year. 
This is far more frequent than any of the individual events (including spin-out and transforma-
tion) on its own. On the other hand, these five events are all much less frequent than entry or 
exit. We decide to construct a new variable where we add the individual rates for take-overs, 
divesting and expansion together with the combined one. This is the variable that will be in-
cluded in the factor analysis. We keep the two other events (transformation and spin-out) 
separate, because their nature is different from the other events, and from each other. 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 15
The two databases provide detailed information about the sectors in the Norwegian economy. 
Our theoretical framework, as discussed in the previous section, suggests that there are par-
ticular (causal) relationships between these variables and the underlying dimensions they cap-
ture, but we do not have a full model that outlines these relations in a precise way. Conse-
quently, we take an explorative perspective, and apply a methodology that is aimed at outlin-
ing the major relations between the various indicators, rather than investigating their causal 
links. The first step in the explorative analysis is using Principals Components Factor Analy-
sis on pre-selected groups of variables. The extracted factors are then used as input for the 
cluster analysis. This method can be described as a bottom-up approach to the identification 
of regimes as we define them, based upon the information available to us in our database. 
This is somewhat in contrast to prior studies in this tradition, which have mainly attempted to 
confirm existing taxonomies using new data sources (e.g., Marsili and Verspagen, 2002; Cas-
tellacci, 2007). To use an existing taxonomy was not an option for us because we want to con-
front the idea of systemic lock-in in Norway in an open-ended way, i.e., to see how this idea 
holds up if we subject it to a broad set of alternative taxonomies.  
Our analysis is done at the level of sectors. We assign each firm in our database to an indus-
trial sector and information is aggregated from the enterprise and business unit level to the 
sector level. Survey data from the R&D and innovation survey was aggregated to the sector 
level using weights generated by SSB in order to ensure that the industrial sectors data is rep-
resentative. In total, we have 60 industrial sectors in our database which covers firms in both 
the manufacturing and service sectors, at the 3 or 4 digit NACE level. The sectors are listed in 
the appendix. They were defined as an ad hoc list that is very much specific to Norway. This 
specificity is first of all related to the existing Norwegian specialization pattern, and we try to 16
include as separate entities sectors that have attracted attention before (e.g., we include fish-
farming as a separate sector, which would not be useful for most other countries than Nor-
way). Another way in which the list of sectors is specific to Norway is that we have only in-




We apply principal components analysis with varimax rotation order to reduce the number of 
dimensions in the data, and to extract empirical measures of latent factors believed to classify 
industrial sectors into different technological regimes or clusters. The number of factors is 
determined endogenously using an eigenvalue (>1) criterion. Following Marsili and Ver-
spagen (2002) a number of variables have been grouped together on a priori grounds (accord-
ing to Tables 1, 2 and 3), and rotated factor scores have been calculated. The first group of 
variables relates to the resources going into the innovation process. The variables entered and 
the factor loadings for each variable are listed in Table 5. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 5, and in Principals Components Factor Analysis more generally, the principal as-
sumption is that the pattern of correlations between the variables included in the analysis is 
caused by non-observable or latent factors such as the underlying technology at the level of 
industrial sectors. In the rotated factor solution each loading represents the partial correlation 
between the latent factor and the variables in the row to the left in the table. A high factor 
loading indicates that the factor is strongly influenced by the variable. The seven variables 
included in the factor analysis in Table 5 are thus able to measure the existence of three fac-17
tors, and we can see that variables have different factor loading on the three factors. The three 
factors distinguish between sectors where formal R&D is important and embodiment in ma-
chinery is not (factor 1), where external non R&D based knowledge and training are impor-
tant but where R&D is not (factor 2) and lastly where design and marketing of new products 
are more important, but where external R&D is not important (factor 3).
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 6 reports the results for the group of variables that we use to measure technological 
opportunity. Variables measuring the intensity of R&D and innovation load high on the first 
factor, and variables which capture “innovation output” load high on the second factor. The 
first factor accounts for almost 70 % of the observed variance. According to our interpreta-
tion, the first factor is a measure of technological opportunity, and the second factor is a 
measure of persistent innovativeness.
In Table 7 we have tried to measure different aspects of the appropriability regime. All the 
included variables load high on the first factor, with the exception of copyright and trade-
marks, although these loadings are positive. As such, the first factor is a rather clear cut meas-
ure of appropriability instruments in the traditional technology domain, which distinguishes 
between industrial sectors where it is important to protect innovations using formal and in-
formal methods, and sectors where this is not so important. The second factor loads high on 
copyrights and trademarks, which are the instruments that are used for a wider set of innova-
tions than just those that rely on technology (e.g., business models, but also software). 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 18
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 8 we have attempted to measure properties of the knowledge base apart from R&D. 
This focuses on the sources of knowledge/information that are rated as important by the re-
sponding firms. A rather complex picture with four factors emerges, suggesting that the 
knowledge bases differ strongly across sectors. Customers, competitors and suppliers as im-
portant knowledge sources all load rather high on the first factor. Hence, this factor distin-
guishes between sectors where market based knowledge is important, and those where it is 
not. Institutional actors, such as R&D enterprises, universities, and public research organiza-
tions load high on the second factor. As such, this factor captures vital elements of the na-
tional innovation system, and identifies sectors where such institutional actors constitute an 
important knowledge source. The third factor combines a high loading on consultancy enter-
prises with one on exhibitions, trade shows etc. The fourth factor is a rather clear measure of 
firm internal knowledge.  
[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 9 we entered various variables perceived by firms to be hampering factors in the in-
novation process. The outcome of the factor analysis is pretty clear, as the first factor is a 
measure of economic and financial obstacles, combined with regulation, while the second 
factor measures the presence of organizational and technological obstacles. It is interesting to 
note that organizational and technological obstacles go together and seem to form a distinct 
hampering factor. Lack of qualified personnel and market information both load high on the 
third factor. 19
[TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 10 makes a further distinction between types of R&D: product vs. process R&D, and 
basic-applied-development R&D. We extract only one factor for this set of variables, which 
loads high on four of the five variables. The one variable that loads (relatively) low is basic 
R&D, so that this factor essentially captures R&D intensiveness, with the exception of basic 
R&D.
[TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 11 measures non-technological innovation, and distinguishes five forms of this. Essen-
tially, we see that all of these load high together, suggesting that the occurrence of non-
technological innovations can be reduced to a single dimension.  
[TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE] 
The final
5 set of variables that we use in the innovation domain relates to the share of firms’ 
turnover that is related to product innovations. The CIS questionnaire asks for the firm’s share 
of turnover for products new to the market (‘radical innovations’) and products new to the 
firm. We also include the share of turnover of unchanged products. Table 12 presents the re-
sults for this factor analysis. We have one factor, on which both innovations definitions load 
high, implying that the factor captures the importance of product innovation (in general) in 
turnover of the sectors. 20
Having captured and measured the main variables describing innovation and technology at the 
sectoral level, we move on to measure variables related to market structure and industrial dy-
namics. This is done in tables 13 and 14.  
[TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 13 variables measuring the (static) competitive structure in the 60 industries are in-
cluded. This involves variables capturing the distribution of firms over size classes, as well as 
concentration ratios (C4 and C20). The first factor captures essentially the absence of micro 
enterprises (<10 employees), as it loads high on all the size classes with 10 or more employ-
ees, and strongly negative on the zero employees variable. The concentration ratios load high 
on the second factor, which thus distinguishes between sectors according to concentration 
levels. The third factor provides more nuance to this picture, and identifies sectors where em-
ployment is concentrated in large firms (in a Norwegian standard), while not necessarily lead-
ing to high concentration (the concentration ratios have low factor loadings). 
[TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 14 we have entered the variables that capture vital elements of industrial dynamics, 
as opposed to the static picture of the previous table. These are the variables covered in Table 
4 above. The first factor in Table 14 captures general turbulence in a sector, with high factor 
loadings on total entry and exit rates, and a strongly negative loading on survival of entrants. 
But entry in this factor is mainly non-entrepreneurial. The second factor captures entrepreneu-
rial (self-employed) entry, and loads high on both entry and exit rates of this type, but low on 21
the “takeovers, moves and expansion” events that involve incumbent firms. The final third 
factor loads high on spin-outs and transformations. 
Cluster analysis 
The aim of our cluster analysis is to obtain groups of sectors, or regimes, which are relatively 
homogenous in terms of the variables that we put into the clustering procedure, but are differ-
ent from the sectors found in the other regimes. We use the two-step clustering algorithm in 
SPSS to obtain groups of sectors, based on the factor scores obtained using Tables 5 – 14. The 
two-step clustering algorithm has the important advantage that the number of clusters is de-
termined on the basis of an objective criterion (we use Akaike’s information criterion for this 
purpose). The algorithm works by first forming a number of pre-clustering groups, and then 
merging these groups in a more-or-less traditional hierarchical clustering method.
6 We per-
form the clustering both for the factors in the innovation domain (Tables 5 – 12), and for the 
industrial domain (Tables 13 – 14). We start by entering all factors into the analysis, and per-
form a Bonferroni adjusted t-test for differences of the clusters (centroids) relative to the total 
sample mean. When a variable (factor) turns up for which none of the clusters is significantly 
different from the sample mean (we use a 10% significance threshold), we omit this factor 
and run the cluster analysis again, until all variables have at least one cluster that is signifi-
cantly different from the sample mean. In this way, we ensure that variables that do not dis-
tinguish between clusters (regimes) do not influence the results.
Table 15 presents the results of the cluster analysis for the innovation variables, or, in other 
words, the innovation regimes that we find for the Norwegian economy.
7 We have two re-
gimes (clusters), which are fairly equally divided in terms of the number of sectors (24 and 
36). In terms of the differences between the clusters, the interpretation of the results is fairly 22
straightforward: the large cluster (36 industries, cluster 2) tends to score high on the innova-
tion-related variables, and the smaller cluster (24 industries, cluster 1) scores low. In other 
words, the distinction into two regimes that we find can be interpreted as a low- and high-
innovation intensive dichotomy. Note, however, that using these labels, the high innovation 
intensive share of the economy includes a relatively large number of sectors, including sectors 
that would traditionally classify as low innovation intensity sectors. Examples of the latter are 
‘knitted fabrics and products’ and ‘ships and boats’. Two of the most internationally visible 
Norwegian sectors, fish farming and extraction of crude oil and gas, are also classified in the 
high innovation intensity regime. 
[TABLE 15 ABOUT HERE] 
One, two and three starts indicate significant differences (at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, re-
spectively) of the cluster centroids from the total sample mean in a t-test with Bonferroni ad-
justment. 
These high innovation intensity sectors score high on the importance of formal R&D, on 
R&D intensity, on persistence of innovation, on the use of appropriability instruments, on 
internal knowledge sources, on non-technological innovation, and on the importance of new 
products in turnover. The low innovation intensity sectors, on the other hand, score relatively 
low in all variables in the table, except the use of non-R&D external knowledge and training 
(this is higher in the non-innovation intensive sectors). 
In the domain of industrial structure and dynamics, we have a total of six factors from Tables 
13 and 14. In the cluster analysis, all these factors contribute significantly to the distinction 23
between the clusters. We obtain four clusters for these five factors. Table 16 shows the details 
(cluster centroids and number of members) for the four clusters. 
[TABLE 16 ABOUT HERE] 
One, two and three starts indicate significant differences (at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, re-
spectively) of the cluster centroids from the total sample mean in a t-test with Bonferroni ad-
justment. 
We obtain two small (one and two) clusters, and two larger ones (three and four). In the do-
main of the static market structure variables (i.e., the first three factors), cluster number two is 
the only one that does not distinguish itself from the mean total sample values. In this domain, 
cluster one is the least competitive one. It shows significantly higher market concentration 
than the average, and also scores significantly higher on “absence of microfirms”. The two 
other clusters are somewhat paradoxical in the static domain. Cluster three has few micro-
firms (significantly higher on the “absence of microfirms” factor), but also few large firms 
(significantly lower on this factor), and hence consists of sectors with many small (but not 
very small) and medium-sized firms. Cluster four is the exact opposite: it scores significantly 
higher on large firms, but also on microfirms (i.e., significantly lower on “absence of micro-
firms”).  
In the dynamic market structure domain, perhaps the most obvious result is that in the non-
competitive cluster one, we find significantly lower than average entrepreneurial entry and 
transformations/spin-outs. On the whole then, cluster one seems to be a set of rather stable
and concentrated sectors. Cluster two just shows high turbulence, and does not score signifi-24
cantly different from the average in any other way. Cluster number three, with its stress on 
medium-sized firms, distinguishes itself in the domain of the dynamic market structure vari-
ables by relatively high spin-out and transformations. Incumbent firms in this cluster are the 
only ones that show higher than average restructuring events (spin-outs and transformation). 
Finally, cluster four is the entrepreneurial one, although it is somewhat surprising that this 
comes with lower general turbulence. 
Discussion
The starting point of our theoretical interpretation of the lock-in argument has been the idea 
that we can discern clear differences in terms of both industrial dynamics regimes, and inno-
vation regimes. The cluster analysis seems to confirm that this is indeed the case. In the indus-
trial dynamics domain, it is especially the stable and concentrated industrial regime, and, to a 
somewhat lesser extent, the incumbent dynamics regime, that answer to the picture of a scale 
dominated environment that offers little opportunities for potential entrants and outsiders in 
general. These two regimes correspond quite intuitively to the environments in which Na-
rula’s (2002) Type A firms operate.  
However, in terms of the distinction between a resource-based and scale intensive nature on 
the one hand, and a science based nature on the other hand, the results are not so clear-cut. 
The first of the two regimes in the Type A group, stable and concentrated, is in fact a mix of 
natural resource-based sectors and science-based sectors, whereas the lock-in argument would 
imply that science-based sectors are largely absent from this regime. The natural resource-
based sectors in this regime are ‘production and distribution of electricity’, ‘pulp and paper’, 
‘basic chemicals’, ‘ferrous basic metals’, and ‘non-ferrous basic metals’ (i.e., five of the eight 
sectors in this regime). The science-based sectors in this regime are ‘pharmaceuticals’ and 25
‘electronic valves and tubes’. In total, six of the eight sectors in this regime rank under the 
high innovation intensity class, and this includes four of the five industries that are resource-
based (Table 17 provides details of the cross-tabulation of the innovation and industrial dy-
namics regimes).  
In the incumbent dynamics regime, the majority of sectors also fall under the high innovation 
intensity regime. Again, there are a number of resource-intensive industries here, but the 
dominance is less strong than in the stable and concentrated regime. Typical resource-
intensive industries in this regime are food industries such as meat- fish- and bakery- prod-
ucts, and construction materials such as ‘saw mills’, ‘builders carpentry’ and ‘bricks, cement, 
concrete and stone’. All these resource intensive industries in this regime are also classified as 
low innovation intensity. The high innovation intensity industries in the incumbent dynamics
regime, on the other hand, are what Pavitt (1984) calls specialized supplier industries, such as 
‘power generating equipment’, ‘machine tools’ and ‘electric motors’, as well as the science-
based industries such as ‘instruments and medical equipment’, and transport equipment indus-
tries such as ‘motor vehicles’ and ‘ships and boats’.  
[TABLE 17 ABOUT HERE] 
In the high turbulence regime (only 6 sectors), we have ‘water transport’ and ‘financial ser-
vices’, which both fall under the low innovation intensity regime, as well as ‘fish farming’, 
‘extraction of crude oil and gas’, ‘telecom services’ and ‘computer services’, which fall in the 
innovation intensive category. These four sectors account for almost 30 % of the total internal 
R&D efforts in the Norwegian economy. A closer look at the composition of internal R&D in 
the innovation intensive high turbulence regime reveals an interesting pattern, most notably 26
that the majority of R&D done in the oil and fish-farming sectors is applied research (70 % 
and 50 % accordingly). In the larger group of the entrepreneurial regime, we also find a num-
ber of resource-intensive industries (‘mining, other than oil and gas’, ‘wood and products’), 
but also the science-based industries ‘computers and office machines’, ‘radio and TV trans-
mitters and receivers’, and ‘R&D and engineering services’.  
In summary, we do find somewhat of a weak correlation between resource-intensity and the 
closed nature of industrial dynamics on the one hand, or a science-based nature and more 
open market structures on the other hand, but there are important exceptions to this correla-
tion. In particular, our analysis suggests that important resource-based Norwegian sectors 
such as fish farming and the oil sector do not have a concentrated and closed industrial struc-
ture. Rather, these sectors appear in our analysis as industries in which market dynamics are 
more turbulent than the average, and also they seem to belong to the high innovation intensive 
part of the Norwegian economy.  
This may be a surprising result especially for the oil sector, since this sector is traditionally 
seen as dominated by a couple of very large firms (but note that we also include firms that 
deliver to the oil drillers, and the dominance of large firms is less obvious here). Our impres-
sion, based on anecdotal evidence, is that although the oil sector could have been described as 
a stable and concentrated regime up to the 1990s, this is no longer the case. In the 1990s, and 
the decades before, the oil sector in Norway was dominated by around 20 giant corporations. 
Since 2000, more than 50 new oil companies have entered the sector. This rather revolution-
ary change has been partly due to a high oil price, but also due to changes in legislation and 
policy support of smaller oil firms which were introduced in 2000 (OD, 2007). Smaller firms 
have been encouraged by policymakers to develop the high number of smaller oil fields on the 27
Norwegian continental shelf, in order to maximize oil production, as the bigger oil fields are 
reaching, or have gone beyond, maturity.  Smaller companies are thus in the business of de-
veloping smaller oil fields not developed by the giant corporations as specialized oil produc-
ers. As such it is important to understand the interactions between the oil sector and the Nor-
wegian NIS, especially the institutional domain, as these two levels co-evolve. The revolu-
tionary change in the oil sector has further been facilitated by the introduction of new tech-
nologies such as floating oil production and subsea oil exploration and production technolo-
gies (see Engen, 2007 for an elaborated view).
Table 17 also provides information about the importance of the various regimes for the Nor-
wegian economy, in terms of the regimes’ share in R&D, employment and turnover (sales).
8
In light of the previous discussion, an obvious way of cutting across the eight detailed regimes 
is to look at the totals of the concentrated and stable and the incumbent dynamics regimes on 
the one hand, and the high turbulence and entrepreneurial regimes on the other hand. Al-
though the distribution of especially employment is fairly even between those two groups, the 
stable and incumbent dynamics regimes account for the smaller share of the Norwegian econ-
omy. Thus, we do not have much evidence for a lock-in into those regimes.  
Looking at the detailed level, the incumbent dynamics and low innovation intensity combina-
tion is the largest category of the eight possible combinations. This accounts for about one 
third of total turnover (sales), although only 23% of employment. The runner-up in this re-
spect is the four sectors combination of high innovation intensity and high turbulence. This 
combination accounts for almost 30% of total turnover, although only for about 10% of em-
ployment. In terms of R&D, this is the largest group, with almost 30%. If we interpret these 
two groups as the dominant regimes found in the Norwegian innovation system, than we have 28
a picture that diverges somewhat from the idea of a locked-in system. Our picture is one in 
which there is indeed an ‘inert’ sector in the Norwegian economy, in which market dynamics 
are slow, typically related to incumbent firms, and where innovation is generally at a low 
level. But part of this inert set of sectors is also innovation-intensive. On the other hand, there 
is also a part of the Norwegian economy where market turbulence and innovation are both 
high. This part includes the oil sector, which obviously carries a lot of weight in Norway, and 
fish-farming. Our data clearly suggest that this sector falls in a high innovation intensity – 
turbulent markets regime, but this may be a conclusion that is challenged by some who take a 
more qualitative perspective. 
It is further interesting to note that the pattern of sectoral specialization in Norway, when it 
comes to the nature of technology and knowledge underlying industrial innovation on the one 
hand, and the dynamics of market structure on the other hand, partly cuts across the manufac-
turing and services distinction. Most notably, R&D engineering services go together with cer-
tain manufacturing industrial sectors, such as machinery industries and production of com-
puters, and seem to form a distinct innovation intensive entrepreneurial regime. Computers 
and telecom services form, in addition to the oil and gas and fish-farming, a distinct innova-
tion intensive turbulent regime. Hence, there exist rather close similarities between certain 
manufacturing and services industries in Norway, which have important implications for the 
understanding of the origin and evolution of technological change in the Norwegian economy.  
With regard to services, our results suggest that the majority (7 of the 10 services sectors that 
we have) belong to the low innovation intensive group. The three high innovation intensive 
services are Telecom services, Computer services, and R&D, engineering, architecture and 
design. With regard to the industrial dynamics regimes, all four regimes that we identified 29
contain at least one services sector, which implies that services as a whole are rather hetero-
geneous with regard to industrial dynamics.  
Conclusions
We have investigated in a quantitative and data-intensive way the idea that the Norwegian 
innovation system is locked-in to a specialization pattern of resource- and scale-intensive in-
dustries, associated with the large scale industrialization path discussed by Wicken (2007), 
and that the system selects against entrepreneurial initiatives and science-based technology-
intensive sectors. Our conclusions are that resource-and scale intensity is indeed important in 
a part of the Norwegian economy, and also that there are sectors in Norway that can be char-
acterized as inert in terms of their industrial dynamics. But we do not find particularly strong 
evidence that innovation performance is strongly correlated with closed market structures. 
Rather, the set of inert sectors in terms of market structures includes both innovation-intensive 
and science-based sectors, and non-innovation intensive and resource based sectors. Thus, our 
results indicate that the inert market structure in some sectors does not seem to have particu-
larly negative implications for innovation in Norway, since many of the individual industries 
that appear to belong to the relatively closed, resource-based and inert part of the economy are 
still rather innovation intensive. The general absence of a strong relationship between indus-
trial market dynamics regimes and innovation performance suggests that no strong pattern of 
innovation related lock-in exists in the Norwegian economy. 
As a natural result of the characteristics of the Norwegian economy, these conclusions depend 
to a large extent on individual sectors. In particular, we find that the basic chemicals and basic 
metals industries indeed belong to a broader group of sectors that are relatively concentrated 30
and stable (but this is something that is shared with, e.g., pharmaceuticals), but that the oil 
sector and fish farming belong instead to a much more open regime.  
Notes
1 We gratefully acknowledge funding from the Norwegian Research Council, The Ruhrgas Foundation and the 
P.M Røwdes Foundation.  We thank Keith Smith, Bo Carlsson, Fulvio Castellacci, Jan Fagerberg, and Ole An-
dreas Engen for helpful comments.  
2 This literature revolves around the so-called Schumpeterian Hypotheses of increasing returns to firm size and 
market concentration in innovation, see Kamien and Schwartz (1982) Cohen (1995), Cohen and Levin (1989), 
Van Cayseele (1998) for reviews. We regard the recent folly around Aghion et al. (2005) results largely as a 
repetition of this literature.  
3 2001 is the year we use to measure all industrial dynamics variables. 
4 In particular, we compared the sum of weights in a sector to the sum of firms. If the discrepancy is large, this 
implies that our coverage is not very large, and we tend to aggregate the sector into a larger whole. No fixed 
rules where used to decide on this, and we cannot provide full details of the procedure for reasons of confidenti-
ality of the data. 
5 We also experimented with a factor analysis on cooperation in innovation, using the variables on the impor-
tance of several partner categories. However, since these variables do not show up significantly in the cluster 
analysis below, we do not present these results here. 
6 The pre-clustering step is especially useful in the case of a large number of observations, since it reduces the 
number of units entered into the hierarchical clustering. This is not very important in our case, where we only 
have 60 sectors. 
7 The appendix shows full details of which industries are classified into the regimes. 
8 The R&D performed in our 60 sectors is equal to total business R&D in Norway, but the 60 sectors do not 
cover total production or employment. However, we scaled the shares in such a way that they all sum to 100%, 
i.e., we disregard here the employment and turnover shares of firms that do not belong to one of 60 sectors.   31
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Innovation expenditures  Spread over several categories of expenditures   
Number of innovators  Share of innovators; share of firms with product and process inno-
vation, fraction of firms with permanent R&D activity.  
 
Access to knowledge  Importance of internal and external information sources relevant to 
innovation 
 
Protection of innovation  Different methods to protect innovations   
R&D expenditures  Spread over several categories in relation to sales   
Hampering factors  Importance of obstacles in the innovation process   
 





Concentration  Size classes, C4, C20   
Market turbulence  Entry and exit, entrepreneurial (self-employed) entry 
and exit, survival rates  
 
Details of industrial dynamics  No change, transformation, takeover, move, spin-out, 
entrepreneurial new, new by expansion 
 
 




No change  An existing establishment continues within the same existing enterprise 
Transformation  An existing establishment continues and becomes a new independent enterprise, 
and the old enterprise is closed down 
Take-over  An existing establishment continues within another existing enterprise, and the 
old enterprise is closed down 
Divesting  An existing establishment continues within another existing enterprise, and the 
old enterprise survives 
Spin-out  An existing establishment continues and becomes a new independent enterprise, 
and the old enterprise survives 
Entrepreneurial 
new 
A new establishment comes into existence as a new independent enterprise 
New by expan-
sion 
A new establishment comes into existence within an existing enterprise 
Complete closure  An establishment is closed down and the enterprise it belongs to is also closed 
down 
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Table 4. Summary statistics for market dynamics variables 
Variable Mean Standard  deviation
Entry rate  10.60 4.51 
Exit rate  11.02 3.54 
Entrepreneurial entry  4.23 3.57 
Entrepreneurial exit  5.01 3.36 
Non-entrepreneurial entry rate  5.68 3.89 
Survival rate  63.4 7.35 
Take-over rate  0.228 0.406 
Divesting rate  0.085 0.258 
Expansion rate  0.200 0.367 
Take-over, divesting and expansion rate  1.558 1.994 
Spin-out rate  0.127 0.228 
Transformation rate  0.493 0.465 
 
Table 5: Measuring distribution of innovation expenditures 
Factor loadings  Share of total innovation expenditures 
First factor  Second factor  Third factor 
Internal R&D   0,765  -0,528  0,077 
Machinery    -0,990 0,013 -0,071 
Marketing of new products  0,036  0,054  0,796 
External acquisition of knowledge   0,015  0,874  0,011 
Design  0,081 0,281 0,623 
External R&D  0,520  0,238  -0,542 
Training -0,167  0,719  0,295 
Cumulative % of explained variance  32 %  53,5 %  71,2 % 
 
Table 6. Measuring technological opportunity 
Factor loadings   
First factor  Second factor 
R&D expenditure as a fraction of sales  0,961  0,194 
R&D personnel as a fraction of total employment  0,903  0,356 
Research expenditure as a fraction of total sales  0,907  -0,021 
Total innovation expenditure as a fraction of sales  0,916  0,176 
% of innovating firms  0,455  0,856 
% of firms with a product innovation  0,500  0,827 
% of firms with a process innovation  0,331  0,871 
Fraction of firms with permanent R&D activities  -0,207  0,695 
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Table 7. Measuring appropriability conditions 
Factor loadings  Fraction of firms within an industry which use:  
First factor  Second factor 
Patent application to protect an innovation  0,837  -0,113 
Design patent to protect an innovation  0,580  0,230 
Trademark to protect an innovation  0,218  0,794 
Copyright to protect an innovation  0,08  0,786 
Secrecy to protect an innovation.  0,647  0,247 
Complex design to protect an innovation.  0,767  0,211 
Lead time to protect an innovation.  0,788  0,172 
Cumulative % of explained variance  0,44  0,60 
 
Table 8. Measuring sources of information for innovation 
Factor loadings  % Firms that rate the following sources 
of information as important for their 
innovations: 






Consultancy enterprise  -0,41  0,34  0,69  0,12 
R&D enterprise  -0,38  0,75  0,17  0,22 
Within enterprise group  0,02  -0,05  -0,11  0,86 
Suppliers 0,46  -0,13  0,26  -0,05 
Customers 0,80  -0,19  0,09  0,14 
Competitors 0,82  0,25  -0,08  0,18 
Universities 0,18  0,85  0,13  0,06 
Public research organizations  -0,07  0,75  0,11  -0,28 
Meetings and journals  0,23  0,19  0,51  0,37 
Exhibitions 0,23  0,11  0,75  -0,17 
Within the enterprise   0,44  -0,01  0,39  0,58 
Cumulative % of explained variance  24 %  47 %  57 %  67 % 
 
Table 9. Measuring hampering factors for innovation 
Factor loadings  % Firms that rate the following hamper-
ing factors as important in their innova-
tion processes: 
First factor  Second factor  Third factor 
Too high economic risk  0,83  0,29  0,05 
Too high innovation costs  0,80  0,23  0,18 
Lack of finance  0,62  0,52  0,13 
Organizational rigidities  -0,12  0,78  0,17 
Lack of qualified personnel  0,28  0,10  0,80 
Lack of technological information  0,15  0,81  0,06 
Lack of market information  0,02  0,13  0,85 
Too strong regulation  0,71  -0,11  0,08 
Lack of interest among costumers  0,31  -0,09  0,04 






   37
Table 10. Measuring the nature of R&D in sectors 
Factor loadings  % share of the following R&D types in 
total sales in a sector:  First factor 
Process-related R&D  0,81 
Product-related R&D  0,95 
Basic R&D  0,50 
Applied R&D  0,81 
Development R&D  0,87 
Cumulative % of explained variance  64 % 
 
Table 11. Measuring non-technological innovations  
Factor loadings  % share of firms with the following in-
novations:  First factor 
Innovation in strategy  0.91 
Management innovation  0.83 
Organizational innovation  0.87 
Marketing innovation  0.87 
Esthetic innovations in products  0.76 
Cumulative % of explained variance  71 % 
 
Table 12. Measuring importance of new products for turnover  
Factor loadings  % share of product categories in sectoral 
turnover:  First factor 
Unchanged products  -0.98 
Products new to the firm  0.98 
Products new to the market  0.92 
Cumulative % of explained variance  92 % 
 
Table 13. Measuring market concentration 
Factor loadings  Market concentration 
First factor  Second factor  Third 
factor 
Share of firms with 0 employees   -0,95  -0,13  0,29 
Share of emp. in firms with 1-10 employees   0,20  -0,11  -0,94 
Share of emp. in firms with 11-50 employees  0,87  -0,07  -0,02 
Share of emp. in firms with 51– 200 employees  0,73  0,36  0,49 
Share of emp. in firms with > 200 employees  0,52  0,46  0,54 
Concentration ratio – C4  0,03  0,97  0,09 
Concentration ratio – C20  0,10  0,94  0,17 
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Table 14. Measuring industrial dynamics 
 Factor  loadings 






Exit rate  0.73  0.44  -0.24 
Entry rate  0.86  0.31  -0.13 
Entrepreneurial exit rate  0.11  0.91  -0.08 
Entrepreneurial entry rate  0.20  0.89  -0.08 
Survival rate  -0.85  -0.19  -0.08 
Non-entrepreneurial entry rate  0.82  -0.46  -0.21 
Takeovers, moves, expansion -0.06  -0.56  -0.08 
Spin-out 0.04  -0.04  0.80 
Transformation -0.21  0.02  0.68 
Cumulative proportion of explained variance  38%  60%  72% 
 
Table 15. Innovation regimes in the Norwegian economy 
 Cluster 
 1  2






Table  N 24  36
Formal R&D   5  1  Mean  -0.71  1.16
     Std.  Dev.  0.47  0.47
     **  ***
Non-R&D external knowledge and training 5  2  Mean  0.55  -0.37
     Std.  Dev.  1.24  0.58
     *  ***
Technological opportunity  6  1  Mean  -0.36  0.23
     Std.  Dev.  0.14  1.24
       *** 
Persistence 6  2  Mean  -0.81  0.54
     Std.  Dev.  0.56  0.85
     ***  ***
Appropriability use  7  1  Mean  -0.87  0.58
     Std.  Dev.  0.66  0.73
     ***  ***
Market-based knowledge sources  8  1  Mean  -0.52  0.34
     Std.  Dev.  0.56  1.09
     *** 
Internal knowledge sources  8  4  Mean  -0.56  0.95
     Std.  Dev.  0.37  0.86
     **  **
Economic and financial obstacles  9  1  Mean  -0.39  0.70
   Std.  Dev.  0.26  1.09
     ** 
Organizational and technological obstacles  9  2  Mean  -0.34  0.59
   Std.  Dev.  0.23  1.15
     ** 
R&D intensity  10  1  Mean  -0.58  0.38
     Std.  Dev.  0.39  1.13
       ***  *
Non-technological innovation  11  1  Mean  -0.58  0.38
     Std.  Dev.  0.38  0.93  39
       ***  *
Importance of new products for turnover  12  1  Mean  -0.61  0.41
     Std.  Dev.  0.17  1.11
       ***  *
 
Table 16. Industrial dynamics regimes in the Norwegian economy 
 Cluster       
  1 2 3 4
Factor label  Table from 
which the fac-
tor is drawn 
Factor 
number in 
Table  N 8  6  25  21
No microfirms  13  1  Mean  1.35  -0.12  0.37  -0.92
      Std.  Dev. 0.56 0.33 0.74 0.61
   ***    *  ***
Concentration 13  2  Mean  0.93  0.32  -0.24  -0.16
      Std.  Dev. 0.63 1.20 0.83 1.07
    **   
Large  firms  13  3  Mean  0.93 -0.63 -0.47  0.39
      Std.  Dev. 1.54 0.65 0.78 0.62
       **  **
Turbulence 14  1  Mean  -0.13  2.31  -0.25  -0.32
      Std.  Dev. 0.74 0.39 0.72 0.55
     ***    *
Entrepreneurial  14  2  Mean  -1.16 -0.19 -0.21  0.74
      Std.  Dev. 0.74 1.75 0.48 0.73
    **    ***
Transformation/spinout 14 3  Mean  -1.12  -0.29  0.79  -0.43
      Std.  Dev. 0.46 0.25 0.95 0.50
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Table 17. Innovation and Industrial regimes in the Norwegian economy 







n = 2 
Internal R&D = 0.7% 
Turnover = 3.3% 
Employment = 3.6% 
n = 6 
Internal R&D = 13.4% 
Turnover = 4.9% 
Employment = 5.1% 
n = 8 
Internal R&D = 14.2% 
Turnover = 8.3% 
Employment = 8.7% 
High turbulence re-
gime 
n = 2 
Internal R&D = 3.9% 
Turnover = 5.0% 
Employment = 8.5% 
n = 4 
Internal R&D = 28.6% 
Turnover = 29.8% 
Employment = 9.8% 
n = 6 
Internal R&D = 32.5% 
Turnover = 34.8% 
Employment = 18.3% 
Incumbent dynamics 
regime 
n = 11 
Internal R&D = 4.8% 
Turnover = 32.0% 
Employment = 23.0% 
n = 14 
Internal R&D = 19.6% 
Turnover = 8.8% 
Employment = 11.8% 
n = 25 
Internal R&D = 24.4% 
Turnover = 40.8% 
Employment = 34.8% 
Entrepreneurial re-
gime 
n = 9 
Internal R&D = 2.9% 
Turnover = 11.1% 
Employment = 28.2% 
N = 12 
Internal R&D = 25.6% 
Turnover = 5.0% 
Employment = 9.9% 
n = 21 
Internal R&D = 28.9% 
Turnover = 16.2% 
Employment = 38.2% 
Total  n = 24 
Internal R&D = 12.4% 
Turnover = 51.4% 
Employment = 63.5% 
N = 36 
Internal R&D = 87.6% 
Turnover = 48.6% 
Employment = 36.5% 
n = 60 
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1 Fish  farming  2 2
2  Mining and quarrying, ex. oil and gas  1 4
3  Extraction of crude oil and natural gas, services delivered to this sector  2 2
4 Meat  products  1 3
5 Fish  products  1 3
6 Bakery  products  1 3
7  Other food products, beverages, tobacco  2 3
8  Spinning, weaving and textiles  1 4
9  Carpets, rugs, rope, etc.  1 3
10  Knitted fabrics and products, other wearing apparel  2 4
11  Fur, leather, articles thereof  2 3
12 Saw  mills  1 3
13  Wood, wooden products  2 4
14 Builders  carpentry  1 3
15  Pulp, paper, paper products  2 1
16 Publishing  1 4
17 Printing  1 4
18 Basic  chemicals  2 1
19 Other  chemicals  2 3
20 Pharmaceuticals  2 1
21  Rubber and plastic products  2 3
22  Glass, glass products, ceramics, other minerals products  2 4
23  Bricks, cement, concrete, stone  1 3
24  Ferrous basic metals  2 1
25 Non-ferrous  basic  metals  2 1
26  Casting, forging, pressing of metals, tanks, containers, boilers  2 3
27  Structural metal products  1 3
28  Treatment and coating of metals  1 4
29  Cutlery, tools, crafts, other metal products  2 3
30  Power generating equipment  2 3
31  Other general purpose machinery  2 4
32  Agriculture and forestry machinery  2 4
33  Machine tools and other special purpose machinery  2 3
34 Domestic  appliances  2 4
35  Computers and office machines  2 4
36  Electric motors, generators, electrical distribution  2 3
37  Wire and cable, batteries, other electric equipment  2 3
38  Electronic valves, tubes, etc.  2 1
39  Radio and tv transmitters and receivers  2 4
40  Instruments, medical equipment  2 3
41  Motor vehicles, parts  2 3
42  Ships and boats  2 3
43  Other transportation equipment  2 4
44 Furniture  2 4
45 Other  manufacturing  2 4
46  Waste metal and scrap, recycling thereof  2 3
47  Production and distribution of electricity  1 1
48  Steam, hot water, purification and distribution of water  1 4
49  Building and construction of buildings, installation, finishing  1 4







51 Wholesale  1 3
52 Land  transport  1 4
53 Water  transport  1 2
54 Air  transport  1 1
55  Transportation support, cargo storage  1 3
56  Transportation and travel agents  1 3
57 Telecom  services  2 2
58 Financial  services  1 2
59 Computer  services  2 2
60  R&D, engineering, architecture and design  2 4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 